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Abstract
Difficulties in social cognition are well recognized in individuals with autism spectrum conditions
(henceforth 'autism'). Here we focus on one crucial aspect of social cognition: the ability to empathize
with the feelings of another. In contrast to theory of mind, a capacity that has often been observed to be
impaired in individuals with autism, much less is known about the capacity of individuals with autism
for affect sharing. Based on previous data suggesting that empathy deficits in autism are a function of
interoceptive deficits related to alexithymia, we aimed to investigate empathic brain responses in autistic
and control participants with high and low degrees of alexithymia. Using functional magnetic resonance
imaging, we measured empathic brain responses with an 'empathy for pain' paradigm assessing
empathic brain responses in a real-life social setting that does not rely on attention to, or recognition of,
facial affect cues. Confirming previous findings, empathic brain responses to the suffering of others
were associated with increased activation in left anterior insula and the strength of this signal was
predictive of the degree of alexithymia in both autistic and control groups but did not vary as a function
of group. Importantly, there was no difference in the degree of empathy between autistic and control
groups after accounting for alexithymia. These findings suggest that empathy deficits observed in autism
may be due to the large comorbidity between alexithymic traits and autism, rather than representing a
necessary feature of the social impairments in autism.
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Difficulties in social cognition are well recognized in individuals with autism spectrum conditions (henceforth ‘autism’). Here we
focus on one crucial aspect of social cognition: the ability to empathize with the feelings of another. In contrast to theory of
mind, a capacity that has often been observed to be impaired in individuals with autism, much less is known about the capacity
of individuals with autism for affect sharing. Based on previous data suggesting that empathy deficits in autism are a function of
interoceptive deficits related to alexithymia, we aimed to investigate empathic brain responses in autistic and control partici-
pants with high and low degrees of alexithymia. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we measured empathic brain
responses with an ‘empathy for pain’ paradigm assessing empathic brain responses in a real-life social setting that does not rely
on attention to, or recognition of, facial affect cues. Confirming previous findings, empathic brain responses to the suffering of
others were associated with increased activation in left anterior insula and the strength of this signal was predictive of the
degree of alexithymia in both autistic and control groups but did not vary as a function of group. Importantly, there was no
difference in the degree of empathy between autistic and control groups after accounting for alexithymia. These findings suggest
that empathy deficits observed in autism may be due to the large comorbidity between alexithymic traits and autism, rather than
representing a necessary feature of the social impairments in autism.
Keywords: empathy; autism; alexithymia; interoception; anterior insula; mentalizing; theory of mind
Abbreviations: ADOS-G = Autism Diagnostic Observational Schedule; BVAQ = Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire;
fMRI = functional magnetic resonance imaging; IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; ROI = region of interest; TAS-20 = 20-item
Toronto Alexithymia Scale
Introduction
In recent years, the field of social neuroscience has made rapid
progress in elucidating the neuronal basis of our capacity to
understand mental states such as the thoughts and feelings of
others. According to recent neuroscientific models (Decety and
Jackson, 2004; Blair, 2005, 2008; Decety and Gre`zes, 2006; de
Vignemont and Singer, 2006; Singer, 2006; Singer and Lamm,
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2009), at least two different routes to the understanding of other
minds can be distinguished: our ability to understand the abstract
beliefs and intentions of others, which is referred to as Theory of
Mind, cognitive perspective taking or mentalizing (Premack and
Woodruff, 1978; Frith and Frith, 2003) and our ability to share the
feelings of others, which is referred to as empathy (Wispe´, 1986;
Eisenberg and Strayer, 1987; Eisenberg and Fabes, 1990;
Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 2000; Preston and de Waal, 2002;
Singer et al., 2004, 2006; Blair, 2005; Decety and Lamm, 2006;
de Vignemont and Singer, 2006; Keysers and Gazzola, 2007).
Empathy in turn involves at least two major components: an af-
fective component, which allows us to share the feelings of others,
and a cognitive component, which is related to our capacity for
self-other distinction. When we empathize, we vicariously experi-
ence the emotional state of another person, realizing that what we
are feeling is not our own emotional state but that of the other
person (e.g. Eisenberg, 2000; Decety and Lamm, 2006; de
Vignemont and Singer, 2006).
Even though empathizing and Theory of Mind are usually sim-
ultaneously engaged in social cognition, recent imaging studies
have suggested that the two postulated routes to understanding
others rely on distinct neural networks. Theory of Mind has been
mainly linked to activity of the medial prefrontal cortex, the su-
perior temporal sulcus and the adjacent temporoparietal junction
(for a review see Frith and Frith, 2006; Saxe, 2006; Saxe and
Baron-Cohen, 2006; also Mitchell et al., 2002; Mitchell, 2008).
In contrast, our ability to empathize with other people’s emotional
states (such as disgust or pain) activates parts of those neuronal
networks that are involved when the emotional states are experi-
enced by the self. Thus, activation of brain areas relevant for
emotion processing such as somatosensory, insular and anterior
cingulate cortices have been observed during empathy (Carr
et al., 2003; Wicker et al., 2003; Keysers et al., 2004; Morrison
et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004, 2006, 2008; Jackson et al., 2005,
2006; Jabbi et al., 2007). The most robust evidence for such
shared networks in empathy stems from a multitude of studies
on empathy for pain. These suggest the necessary involvement
of anterior insula and, less consistently, the anterior cingulate cor-
tices when people empathize with the suffering of others
(Morrison et al., 2004, 2007; Singer et al., 2004, 2006, 2008;
Jackson et al., 2005, 2006; Cheng et al., 2007; Gu and Han,
2007; Lamm et al., 2007a, b; Saarela et al., 2007). More gener-
ally, insular cortex, also called ‘interoceptive cortex’, has been
shown to be involved in mapping internal bodily and subjective
feeling states (Damasio, 1994; Craig, 2002, 2003, 2009; Critchley
et al., 2004, 2005; Singer et al., 2009). These findings have led to
the suggestion that cortical representations underlying the repre-
sentation of feeling states in the self also underlie our ability to
share the emotional state of the other (so-called ‘shared-network’
models).
Further evidence speaking to the existence of multiple and dis-
sociable neural networks which underlie different socio-cognitive
abilities comes from studies of patients with specific social dis-
orders such as psychopathy or autism spectrum conditions.
Psychopaths, for example, seem to have an impaired ability to
empathize, but not an impaired ability to understand other peo-
ple’s intentions and goals, a pattern reflected in the oft-reported
Machiavellian nature of psychopaths (Blair, 2003, 2005).
Conversely, individuals with autism spectrum conditions have a
general deficit in the social domain, with evidence for reduced
Theory of Mind (see Frith and Happe´, 2005 for a review) and
reduced activity of the brain network associated with this menta-
lizing capacity (see Frith and Frith, 2006 for a review). In addition,
individuals with autism spectrum conditions have frequently been
characterized as lacking in empathy (Gillberg, 1992;
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2002; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright,
2004; McIntosh et al., 2006; Lombardo et al., 2007;
Minio-Paluello et al., 2009). Baron-Cohen (2009) argues that in-
dividuals with autism spectrum conditions are best described as
being low on empathizing (a construct which includes both cog-
nitive perspective taking and empathy) and high on systemizing
(a construct described as the drive to analyse or construct sys-
tems). In support of this characterization, individuals with autism
spectrum conditions score lower on the Empathy Quotient
(Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004; Johnson et al., 2009),
which assesses the self-reported capacity to take another person’s
mental perspective as well as the capacity to share their feelings.
Further evidence is provided by reduced inhibition of corticospinal
excitability in individuals with autism spectrum conditions when
they observe a painful stimulus being applied to another
(Minio-Paluello et al., 2009) and lower self-reported empathy in
autism spectrum condition populations on empathy questionnaires
such as the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI: Davis, 1980;
Lombardo et al., 2007; however, see Rogers et al., 2007 and
Dziobek et al., 2008 for conflicting findings). Furthermore, when
children with autism were shown vignettes depicting other chil-
dren experiencing various emotions, they reported less emotional
empathy (matching emotional states) with the characters depicted
in the vignettes (Yirmiya et al., 1992).
The claim of a global empathy deficit in autism spectrum con-
ditions does not always reflect, however, the more detailed dis-
tinction made between our capacities to mentalize and to
empathize. For example, a test widely used in autism research
as a marker for empathy is the ‘reading the mind in the eyes
test’ (Baron-Cohen et al., 1996, 1997, 2001). However, this test
does not directly assess emotional responses as it requires one to
infer the expressed mental state from the eye region of emotional
facial expressions, but does not directly measure the vicarious
emotional response elicited by the expression.
A further, important complication with the ‘empathy-deficit’
characterization of autism spectrum conditions is the high comor-
bidity between autism spectrum conditions and alexithymia.
Alexithymia has been described as a subclinical phenomenon
marked by difficulties in identifying and describing feelings and
difficulties in distinguishing feelings from the bodily sensations of
emotional arousal (Nemiah et al., 1976). Alexithymia is thought to
characterize 10% of the general population (Linden et al., 1995;
Salminen et al., 1999). However, although neither a necessary nor
sufficient feature of autism spectrum conditions, recent studies
have found severe degrees of alexithymia in 50% of individuals
with autism spectrum conditions, with the majority showing slight
or severe impairments (Hill et al., 2004; Berthoz and Hill, 2005;
see also Lombardo et al., 2007 and Silani et al., 2008). Thus, it is
unclear whether the empathy deficit reported in individuals with
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autism spectrum conditions is a result of the autism spectrum con-
dition, or whether it is a result of comorbid alexithymia. Indeed, a
previous study suggests that the lack of empathy in autism spec-
trum conditions is a function of interoceptive deficits associated
with alexithymia rather than a function of autism spectrum con-
ditions per se (Silani et al., 2008). Silani et al. showed that the
degree to which participants were able to understand their own
emotions (i.e. their degree of alexithymia) was correlated with
activity in the anterior insula during an interoceptive task (Silani
et al. 2008). Importantly, the relationship between participants’
self-reported degree of alexithymia, and activity in the anterior
insula when introspecting on their emotions, was the same for
both the autism spectrum conditions and control groups.
Participants with autism spectrum conditions but without alexithy-
mia showed normal activity in the anterior insula during interocep-
tion, suggesting that they were unimpaired in understanding their
own emotions. Furthermore, participants’ self-reported degree of
alexithymia, and activity in the anterior insula when introspecting
on emotion, were correlated with scores on a classical self-report
measure of trait empathy (Davis, 1980).
The association between alexithymia and empathy is predicted
by the previously described ‘shared network’ models of empathy:
these models suggest that the networks responsible for processing
emotions in the self are the same networks used to represent the
emotions of others. Thus, a difficulty representing one’s own emo-
tions would result in a deficit in representing others’ emotions (e.g.
Singer et al., 2004, 2009). The findings of Silani et al. (2008)
provide initial support for the hypothesized role of the anterior
insula in alexithymia and empathy and suggest that degree of
empathy within individuals with autism spectrum conditions is
associated with their degree of alexithymia. However, Silani
et al.’s (2008) study leaves at least two crucial questions un-
answered. As the study included only a self-reported measure of
empathy without testing empathy directly, it could only show that
alexithymia was associated with the degree to which individuals
with autism spectrum conditions were consciously aware of their
empathic response. As alexithymia is a deficit in identifying and
describing one’s own emotion, it is possible that the alexithymic
individuals with autism spectrum conditions did have an empathic
reaction, but were unable to identify and therefore report this
reaction.
The second question left unanswered by Silani et al.’s (2008)
study is whether there is a general empathic deficit associated with
autism spectrum conditions that is not explained by alexithymia;
that is, whether even non-alexithymic individuals with autism
spectrum conditions show reduced empathy.
Therefore, in the present study, we aimed to test empathy in
individuals with autism spectrum conditions directly and to deter-
mine whether any deficits are due to their autism spectrum con-
dition and/or a result of the increased level of alexithymia in this
group. We therefore tested empathy in a group of individuals with
autism spectrum conditions selected to ensure a wide distribution
of alexithymia scores and a matched control group (of individuals
without autism spectrum conditions) with the same wide distribu-
tion of alexithymia scores. Significantly, we tested empathy in the
domain of pain using a well-established empathy-for-pain func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigm that has been
shown to involve activation of the interoceptive cortices but not
the cognitive perspective taking network (Singer et al., 2004,
2006, 2008). Therefore, we contend that this task provides a
purer measure of empathy than more commonly used tests and
is minimally confounded by mentalizing. Furthermore, this para-
digm has the advantage of assessing empathy in vivo by measur-
ing the empathic brain responses of participants while their
partners or friends receive pain. Thus, the social emotions are
tested in a real social context. Importantly, the use of symbolic
cues instead of pictorial material helps to overcome the significant
methodological problems associated with testing empathy using
pictures of emotional facial expressions in autism spectrum condi-
tion populations. Several studies have found that individuals with
autism spectrum conditions show decreased attention to the face,
and particularly to eye regions of the face, in comparison to
non-autism spectrum conditions control groups (Boucher and
Lewis, 1992; Klin et al., 1999, 2002; Blair et al., 2002) and may
also have problems recognizing emotional facial expressions
(Howard et al., 2000; Humphreys et al., 2007; see Adolphs
et al., 2001 for conflicting findings). Using the present paradigm,
any empathy deficit seen in the autism spectrum conditions group
cannot be due to reduced attention to the eye regions, which may
be crucial in signalling the pain of the other when pictures of facial
emotion are presented (Adolphs, 2007, 2008), or a failure in in-
terpreting the emotional state of the other. Finally, the present
paradigm allows for the assessment of empathic responses without
requiring verbal reports from participants, a feature which may
facilitate finding empathic responses in alexithymic individuals
and those with autism spectrum conditions.
Based on the findings of Silani et al. (2008), we hypothesized
that autism spectrum conditions do not result in an empathy def-
icit per se. Rather, we hypothesized that empathy-related activity
will vary as a function of the degree of alexithymia in both groups
and be associated with activation in insular cortices.
Materials and methods
Participants
This study required an equal distribution of high and low alexithymic
participants in control and autism spectrum condition groups. As the
prevalence rate of alexithymia differs in autistic and normal control
populations (Hill et al., 2004; Tani et al., 2004), we pre-screened a
larger sample of participants with the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia
Scale (TAS-20) (Bagby et al., 1994) as a measure of alexithymia to
reach our final sample of 18 male participants with autism spectrum
conditions and 18 male controls who were matched on alexithymia
scores, age and IQ. Two-sample t-tests confirmed that the groups
were not significantly different in terms of alexithymia (autism spec-
trum condition mean SD = 57.2 11.8, range 37–80; control
mean SD = 50.3 14.5, range 27–72), age (autism spectrum condi-
tion mean SD = 34.6 13.3, range 19–60; control mean SD =
35.0 12.8, range 22–63), or IQ (autism spectrum condition
mean SD = 115.8 14.6, range 91–140; control mean SD =
118.8 11.7, range 103–149), whereby IQ was assessed with the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III UK; Wechsler, 1999)
(Tables 1 and 2). A Kolmogorov–Smirnov goodness of fit test
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confirmed that both samples are normally distributed on the TAS
(autism spectrum condition D= 0.117, exact P= 0.942; controls
D= 0.169, exact P= 0.624).
All participants in the autism spectrum condition group were high
functioning and had previously received a diagnosis of autism or
Asperger’s Syndrome from an independent clinician according to the
standard Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV cri-
teria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Fifteen participants had
received a diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome and three of autism. In
addition to the clinical diagnosis, we used the Autism Diagnostic
Observational Schedule (ADOS-G; Lord et al., 2000) to characterize
the current level of functioning for the autism spectrum conditions
group further (Table 3). On this measurement, eight participants
met ADOS criteria for autism and five participants met criteria for
autistic spectrum disorders. Four participants scored above the
cut-off point only in one of the two subscales and one participant
was below the cut-off point in both subscales (see ‘Discussion’
section).
Control participants did not exhibit autistic features and were
screened for any pre-existing neurological or psychiatric disorders
using a questionnaire/interview. All participants gave their informed
consent to participate in the study, which was approved by the
Local Ethics Committee and conducted in accordance with the ethical
standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
The empathy-for-pain paradigm used in this study (e.g. Singer et al.,
2004) required participants to bring another individual (henceforth
‘partner’). In contrast to the original paradigm used by Singer et al.
(2004), the participants’ partner was not necessarily their romantic
partner. As the majority of the participants with autism spectrum con-
ditions were not in a romantic relationship, participants were asked to
bring a person with whom they had a significant relationship (family
member, friend or carer). A total of 36 participant pairs took part in
the experiment. Five participants in the autism spectrum condition
group came with their romantic partner, nine with a family member
and one with a close friend. Three participants in the autism spectrum
condition group were not able to bring a partner so they completed
the experiment with a researcher from the Institute of Cognitive
Neuroscience, UCL, with whom they had spent considerable time
during previous testing sessions and thus had developed a friendly
relationship. Ten of the control group came with their romantic part-
ner, two with family members and five with friends. One participant
from the control group was not able to bring a partner and was there-
fore also matched with a researcher with whom he had spent time
during pre-testing. Comparison of the results of previous studies using
this paradigm (Singer et al., 2004, 2006) suggests that empathy to-
wards romantic partners may be higher than towards relative stran-
gers. It is possible that the autism spectrum condition group would
therefore exhibit less empathy as a result of their partner profiles, even
in the absence of any true empathy deficit. Accordingly, the
Relationship Closeness Inventory (Berscheid et al., 1989) was used
to assess the quality and duration of the relationship between the
participants and their respective partners. Analysis of the Relationship
Questionnaire did not reveal any significant difference between the
autism spectrum condition and control groups [t(24) =0.8;
P40.05] or a significant correlation with degree of alexithymia
(autism spectrum condition: r= 0.239, P40.05; control: r= 0.119,
P40.05), suggesting that any observed differences in empathic brain
response were not due to a selection bias in the quality and duration
of the relationship between the participant and their partner. As a final
check, scores from the Relationship Closeness Inventory were entered
into the analysis (reported below) as a covariate. Inclusion of the
covariate did not change the reported results, and it was also not
Table 3 Diagnosis, ADOS-G and alexithymia scores
Participant Diagnosis ADOS
social
interaction
Cut-off = 4
ADOS
communication
Cut-off = 2
ADOS
Total
score
Cut-off = 7
TAS
1 AS 3 4 7 37
2 Autism 5 10 15 41
3 AS 1 5 6a 43
4 AS 1 1 2b 44
5 AS 2 5 7 51
6 AS 4 7 11 48
7 Autism 4 6 10 52
8 AS 4 6 10 55
9 AS 2 8 9 59
10 AS 4 8 12 59
11 AS 3 4 7 61
12 Autism 3 8 11 62
13 AS 3 4 7 67
14 Autism 3 7 10 60
15 AS 2 4 6a 80
16 AS 1 2 3a 71
17 AS 0 5 5a 66
18 AS 6 11 17 73
The diagnosis refers to the original clinical assessment provided by a qualified
psychologist or psychiatrist (AS = Asperger’s syndrome). Scores on the ADOS-G
are derived from the diagnostic algorithm and represent the behaviour of the
participant at the time of the study. TAS represents scores on the TAS-20
Alexithymia questionnaire.
a: Below cut-off on one ADOS-G subscale.
b: Below cut-off on both ADOS-G subscale.
Table 1 Demographic characteristics and pain thresholds
Autism
spectrum
condition
mean (SD)
Control
mean (SD)
Autism
spectrum
condition
versus
controls
Age (years) 34.6 (13.3) 35.0 (12.8) P= 0.92
Verbal IQ 117.3 (13.4) 118.9 (7.9) P= 0.70
Performance IQ 110.2 (16.6) 111.9 (11.8) P= 0.75
Full IQ 115.8 (14.6) 118.8 (11.7) P= 0.52
Groups’ means, SD and P-values associated with an independent samples t-test on
the differences between groups *P50.05, **P50.01.
Table 2 Questionnaire data
Autism
spectrum
condition
mean (SD)
Control
mean (SD)
Autism
spectrum
conditions
versus
controls
TAS 57.2 (11.8) 50.3 (14.5) P= 0.13
BVAQ 54.2 (8.4) 51.4 (9.7) P= 0.40
IRI 52.1 (15.4) 59.7 (10.9) P= 0.12
Mean and SD values for both groups, and P-values associated with an inde-
pendent samples t-test on the differences between groups.
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predictive of empathy-related brain activity in either the autism spec-
trum condition or control groups. It should be acknowledged that the
validity of this analysis assumes that participants in both the autism
spectrum conditions and control groups were equally able to complete
the Relationship Closeness Inventory. At present this assumption has
not been empirically tested. We contend, however, that the available
data suggest that the different partner profiles between the autism
spectrum condition and control groups do not explain the observed
results.
Questionnaire measures
In addition to the brain measures, we also assessed individual differ-
ences in empathy with the IRI (Davis, 1980) and validated the TAS-20
alexithymia measure using an alternative alexithymia scale, the
Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ; Vorst and
Bermond, 2001).
Experimental paradigm and procedure
In this study, we adopted the same procedure as described by Singer
et al. (2008). In brief, before entering the scanner room, participants
were familiarized with the experimental task and individual pain
thresholds were determined for each participant pair (see Singer
et al., 2004 for a full description of the procedure). Pain stimulation
was obtained by passing electrical current through a bipolar concentric
surface electrode placed on the dorsum of the left hand of the par-
ticipants and on the dorsum of the right hand of their partners (square
pulse waveform, 100 Hz, 4 ms pulse length, 1 s duration).
After determination of individual pain thresholds, participants were
placed into the scanner and the partner was seated next to the scan-
ner. The participant’s left hand and the partner’s right hand were
placed on a tilted board which enabled the participant to see both
hands with the help of a mirror system. Coloured arrows indicating the
person who was to receive the next painful stimulation were projected
onto a large screen placed in front of the participant. Stimulation in-
tensity was indicated by the brightness of the arrow, light arrows
indicating non-painful low stimulation and dark arrows indicating pain-
ful high stimulation. After each trial, participants rated the subjective
level of unpleasantness on an analogue scale ranging from 10 (very
unpleasant) to +10 (very pleasant) by moving a cursor along the scale
with their right index and middle fingers. Each trial consisted of the
presentation of an anticipatory cue (the arrow) which was followed
after 3.5 s by a small circle of the same colour centred on the screen
indicating the beginning of the electrical stimulation. After 2 s, the
rating scale appeared on the screen for a total duration of 4 s. In
order to reduce socially desirable responding when the participant
rated how unpleasant they found their partner’s pain, the rating
scale was presented in a position on the screen which was not visible
to the partner. The invisibility of the participant’s response to their
partner was emphasized to each participant. The scanning phase con-
sisted of two 9 min sessions and a 10 min structural scan. Each session
consisted of 20 trials for each condition (painful high stimulation and
non-painful low stimulation) and 50% null events where only a fix-
ation cross was presented. The two sessions were blocked with respect
to the recipient of the stimulation. During the first session only the
partner was stimulated (‘other’ condition) and during the second ses-
sion only the participant was stimulated (‘self’ condition). Throughout
both sessions the only part of the partner’s body viewable to the
participant was the partner’s hand.
Imaging data acquisition
MRI brain images were acquired with a 1.5 Tesla system (Siemens
Sonata). Functional whole brain data were obtained using a T2* echo-
planar sequence sensitive to blood oxygen level dependent contrast
(44 slices, 3 mm thickness, gap 0.75 mm, echo time 90 ms, repetition
time 3960 ms per volume). To reduce inhomogeneities in amygdala
and orbitofrontal cortex, a sequence with axial slices tilted by 30
and a flip angle of 90 was used (Deichmann et al., 2002). The func-
tional data were acquired in 2 sessions; the first six volumes of each
session were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. Stimulus
presentation began after the sixth volume. A total of 308 full-brain
volumes for each participant were acquired. Structural images were
obtained with a T1 sequence using a phased-array head coil at the
end of the two functional sessions.
Imaging data analysis
fMRI data were analysed using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM)-5
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London; www.fil
.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). During preprocessing, functional images were re-
aligned to the first volume, spatially normalized to a standard template
with a resampled voxel size of 3 33 mm, and smoothed using a
Gaussian kernel width of 10 mm full width at half maximum (6 mm at
the first level, 8 mm at the second level) (Friston et al., 1995a). After
preprocessing, functional images were analysed in an event-related
fashion (Worsley and Friston, 1995), using the general linear model
(Friston et al., 1995b).
The paradigm is based on a 222 factorial design with
within-subject factors of ‘Pain’ (pain versus no-pain) and ‘Target’
(self versus other) and a between-subjects factor of ‘Group’ (autism
spectrum conditions versus control). To create regressors of interest,
each condition was modelled by convolving a delta function at each
trial onset (presentation of the anticipatory cue) and at each rating
onset (presentation of the rating scale) with a canonical haemodynam-
ic response function over the duration of the event (5.5 and 4 s,
respectively). Residual effects of head motion were corrected for by
including the six estimated motion parameters for each participant as
regressors of no interest. Contrast images were then calculated by
applying appropriate linear contrasts to the parameter estimates for
the regressors of interest.
Region of interest analyses
For our main analysis, we chose a region of interest approach (ROI)
based on two independent empathy-for-pain studies performed previ-
ously with a similar paradigm in male populations only (Singer et al.,
2006, 2008). The ROIs were formally defined by reanalysing function-
al data from these two previous studies to identify areas that were
more active in response to high pain than low pain in the ‘other’
condition in conjunction with high versus low pain in the self condi-
tion. Thus, contrast images for the contrast Other High Pain–Other
Low Pain and Self High Pain–Self Low Pain were entered into a
second-level random effects model using SPM5. An ANOVA, thresh-
olded at P50.05, familywise error corrected for the whole brain, iden-
tified a cluster in left anterior insula (centre of mass 36, 33, 3;
volume 108 mm3; max/min x 39/33, max/min y 30/33, max/
min z 3/3) that defined the ROI. A statistical threshold of P50.05
was used for all ROI analyses.
In order to investigate brain responses outside the a priori ROIs,
additional whole brain analyses were performed. Results of these
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additional analyses are reported in Supplementary Table 1 at a thresh-
old of P50.001, uncorrected.
Results
Questionnaires
As expected, the two questionnaire measures of alexithymia (TAS
and BVAQ) were highly correlated (autism spectrum condition:
r= 0.772, P50.01; control: r= 0.703, P50.01), suggesting that
individual differences in alexithymia could be reliably measured
in both groups. As in our previous study (Silani et al., 2008), a
significant negative correlation was found between scores on the
alexithymia questionnaire (TAS-20) and scores on the IRI
(r=0.422, P50.05), suggesting a relationship between degree
of alexithymia and self-reported empathy. An independent sam-
ples t-test revealed that the autism spectrum condition and control
groups did not differ significantly on self-reported trait empathy as
measured by the IRI [t(30) =1.6; P40.05].
Stimulus sensitivity and behavioural
ratings of unpleasantness
In order to test for differences in stimulus sensitivity between
groups, the amplitude of the stimulation measured in mA (i.e.
the participants’ high and low pain thresholds) was entered in a
repeated measures ANOVA with a within-subjects factor of Pain
(high versus low pain) and a between-subjects factor of Group
(autism spectrum conditions versus control). The analysis revealed
a main effect of Pain [F(1,29) = 37.4, P50.001], but the main
effect of Group was not significant [F(1,29) = 1.24, P40.05]
(Table 4).
In order to corroborate the subjective nature of the pain thresh-
olding procedure, we performed an ANOVA on the unpleasant-
ness ratings for low and high pain stimulation during the self and
the other conditions with two within-subjects factors (Pain:
pain versus no-pain; Target: self versus other) and one
between-subjects factor (Group: autism spectrum condition
versus control). The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Pain
[F(1,29) = 80.2, P50.001] and a significant interaction between
Pain and Group F(1,29) = 7.49, P50.011]. Follow-up t-tests re-
vealed that the groups gave significantly different unpleasantness
ratings for the low pain condition {both for the self [t(29) =2.7;
P50.01, unpaired t-test] and the other [t(29) =2.4; P50.05,
unpaired t-test]}, but not for the high pain condition. Inspection of
the mean ratings shows that the autism spectrum condition group
judged the unpleasantness of the low pain stimulation to be close
to zero, while the controls rated the low pain as slightly pleasant
(Table 4).
Interestingly, a significant correlation was not found between
participants’ self-reported level of alexithymia and ratings of un-
pleasantness in either the self or the other condition [self condi-
tion: autism spectrum condition: r=0.127, P40.05; control:
r=0.164, P40.05; other condition: autism spectrum condition:
r=0.055, P40.05; control: r= 0.153, P40.05]. These results are
in line with the findings of our previous study (Silani et al., 2008),
in which behavioural ratings did not differ as a function of alex-
ithymia in spite of clear differential brain responses in anterior
insula for high and low alexithymic participants during interocep-
tion on emotions. Although speculative, this finding may suggest
that alexithymic individuals are able to use a cognitive rule, per-
haps based on social desirability, to make their response when
tasks are as simple as those used in these studies.
Functional imaging results
To determine whether the often-reported empathy deficit in
autism spectrum conditions is due to the alexithymia comorbidity
within this group or to the presence of an autism spectrum con-
dition, we sought to investigate: (i) whether empathic brain re-
sponses were correlated with degree of alexithymia in autism
spectrum condition and control groups; (ii) whether the relation-
ship between degree of alexithymia and empathic brain response
varied as a function of autism spectrum condition diagnosis; and
(iii) whether the autism spectrum condition and control groups
exhibited differential levels of empathic brain activity after
accounting for levels of alexithymia.
To perform these analyses, mean contrast values in the ROI
were extracted using the MaRsBaR toolbox (Brett et al., 2002)
for the contrast High Pain in the Other–Low Pain in the Other
group. These values served as an index of empathic brain response
and were entered as the dependant variable into regression
models including TAS-20 scores for each group separately, and
in combined models.
Our first analysis revealed that mean activity in the left anterior
insula was significantly negatively correlated with TAS scores in
both groups (Fig. 1). The higher the self-reported degree of alex-
ithymia, the lower the empathy-related activity in this region when
the partner received pain (autism spectrum condition: r=0.506,
P50.05; control, r=0.536, P50.05).
Secondly, in order to investigate whether the relationship be-
tween empathic brain responses and alexithymia varies as a func-
tion of group, we performed a Potthoff (1966) analysis to test the
null hypothesis of no difference between groups in the correlation
coefficients, slopes, and intercepts of the two regressions. This
analysis revealed that neither the degree of association (r)
Table 4 Pain stimulation thresholds and pain ratings
Autism
spectrum
condition
mean (SD)
Control
mean (SD)
Autism
spectrum
condition
versus
controls
Pain threshold (mA)
Low 0.29 (0.13) 0.33 (0.17) P= 0.55
High 1.50 (1.40) 2.08 (1.52) P= 0.24
Pain rating
Self low 0.8 (2.7) 2.0 (3.6) P= 0.02*
Self high 5.6 (2.3) 5.9 (2.7) P= 0.68
Other low 1.2 (3.1) 2.1 (3.4) P= 0.01**
Other high 4.6 (3.4) 5.5 (2.5) P= 0.43
Statistics applied: independent samples t-test. *P50.05, **P50.01.
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between activity in the anterior insula and alexithymia, nor the
slope of the regression line, nor the intercept differed significantly
between groups [F(2.32)51, P= 0.548, t(32) =0.749, P= 0.459,
t(32) = 0.919, P= 0.365, respectively].
Thirdly, in order to test for any group differences in empathic
brain activity in the anterior insula independent of the degree of
alexithymia, activity in the anterior insula was entered into an
ANCOVA with Group (autism spectrum condition versus control)
as a between-subjects factor and the TAS scores as a covariate.
This analysis showed that the groups were not significantly differ-
ent [F(1,35) 51], indicating that there were no differences in
empathic brain activity due to the presence or absence of an
autism spectrum condition diagnosis after controlling for the
degree of alexithymia.
In subsequent analyses, we explored the validity of our ROI
analyses using whole brain analyses. First, in order to replicate
the typical pattern of empathic brain activation observed in
previous empathy-for-pain studies and confirm the relationship
between empathy and alexithymia, participants were divided
into high and low alexithymic groups (median split low alexithy-
mia, mean SD = 42.3 8.2, n= 18 and high alexithymia,
mean SD = 65.2 5.8, n= 18) and activity in interoceptive
cortices were compared (Supplementary Table 1). As in previous
studies (Singer et al., 2004, 2006, 2008), pain-related empathic
brain responses were identified by masking the contrast of painful
versus non-painful trials in the other condition with the contrast
of painful versus non-painful trials in the self condition. This pro-
cedure allows us to identify brain regions that are activated by
both the processing of pain in the self and empathy for pain in the
other (i.e. a shared pain network for the self and other).
Consistent with our ROI analysis, the results of this analysis re-
vealed peak activation in left anterior insula in the low alexithymic
group (33, 30, 0; z= 3.79, P50.001, uncorrected) and for the
difference between low and high alexithymic groups (33, 33, 0;
z= 3.33, P50.001, uncorrected).
We further tested for group differences between patients with
autism spectrum conditions and control participants to guard
against the possibility that empathic differences between the
autism spectrum condition and control groups occur in areas out-
side the pre-defined ROI. This is especially pertinent as the ROIs
were defined on the basis of a sample of individuals without an
autism spectrum condition, and although one would expect that
this would result in a relative ‘advantage’ for the control group in
demonstrating empathic brain responses, it is important to test for
empathic differences between groups across the whole brain. The
contrast High Pain–Low Pain in the other, masked on High Pain–
Low Pain in the Self, revealed that the only area in which the
control group showed increased activity in response to pain in
the other was in visual cortex (24 81 9; z= 3.72, P50.001,
uncorrected), which is not part of the typical pain matrix, nor a
part of the empathy or Theory of Mind networks.
A final analysis was conducted to investigate a possible concern
with respect to the current study: that alexithymia scores are a
proxy for symptom severity in autism spectrum conditions. If true,
the present findings could be explained by hypothesizing that
controlling for degree of alexithymia before testing for group dif-
ferences in empathy causes all variance due to autism spectrum
condition symptom severity to be removed. This would result in a
spurious null result and a false conclusion of there being no em-
pathy deficit in autism spectrum conditions after controlling for
alexithymia. Such a possibility is made plausible by the inclusion
of participants who, despite having received a clinical diagnosis of
autism or Asperger’s Syndrome, do not meet ADOS-G cut-off in
the sample of individuals with autism spectrum conditions. These
individuals may raise the mean empathic brain response in the
autism spectrum condition group and mask any differences in em-
pathy due to diagnosis of an autism spectrum condition (if alex-
ithymia scores are a proxy for autism spectrum condition symptom
severity the corollary of this would also be true; highly alexithymic
participants in the control group may also have high levels of
autism spectrum condition symptoms). To guard against the pos-
sibility that any null effects observed in the data could be caused
by overly inclusive diagnostic classification, or statistical covariance
between ADOS scores and alexithymia scores, the ADOS scores
were regressed against empathy-related brain data and alexithy-
mia scores as measured by the TAS. ADOS scores were unrelated
to these measures (all correlations P40.4). Inspection of scatter-
plots (Supplementary Figs 1–3) showing the relationship between
the ADOS and empathy-related brain data, TAS and BVAQ scores,
reveals that it is not the case that participants with low ADOS
scores are clustered at the extremes of the distributions of any
measure. In addition, the relationship between alexithymia (TAS
scores) and empathic brain responses was found in both the
autism spectrum condition and control groups, who were matched
for degree of alexithymia. Thus, it is unlikely that any of the
Figure 1 Mean activation levels (parameter estimates) of the
voxels lying in the left anterior insula [–36 33 3] defined by the
independent mask (see ‘Materials and methods’ section for
details about ROI analyses) during empathy-related conditions
(Pain–No pain in other) are significantly correlated with indi-
vidual differences in alexithymia as measured by the TAS in both
autism spectrum condition (ASD) (red dots) and control (blue
dots) participants. The line represents the linear best fit. All
correlations are significant at the P50.05 level.
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observed effects are an artefact of inappropriate diagnosis, or a
statistical artefact due to high covariance between autism spec-
trum conditions symptom severity and degree of alexithymia.
Discussion
The main goal of this study was to test the widespread assumption
that autistic spectrum conditions are associated with a general lack
of empathy. In order to test for specific empathy deficits in autism
spectrum conditions, we first provided a fine-graded distinction
between two different capacities underlying social cognition: men-
talizing ability (Theory of Mind) and empathic ability. Whereas
autism has been shown to be associated with a deficit in Theory
of Mind (see Frith and Happe´, 2005 for a review), it is much less
clear whether individuals with autism spectrum conditions also
suffer from interoceptive and empathy deficits. An earlier fMRI
study focussing on interoceptive awareness in individuals with an
autism spectrum condition with and without alexithymic symp-
toms (Silani et al., 2008) suggested that it is the degree of alex-
ithymia, which is frequently elevated in individuals with an autism
spectrum condition, rather than the autism spectrum conditions
per se, that is predictive of activation in interoceptive cortex (spe-
cifically, anterior insula), and therefore reduced levels of empathy.
To test this hypothesis, we chose an empathy-for-pain paradigm
that counteracts possible problems associated with the measure-
ment of empathy in autistic populations (i.e. a deficit in facial
emotion recognition, or reduced attention to the eye region of
faces).
The results of the present study confirm the main hypotheses
that the degree of alexithymic traits assessed with the TAS-20
would be associated with the level of empathic brain activation
in anterior insula when participants witnessed a close partner suf-
fering pain. More importantly, this association was not significantly
different for control and autism spectrum condition groups, and
after accounting for degree of alexithymia, individuals with an
autism spectrum condition were not different from control partici-
pants in terms of empathic brain responses in the ROI, or in the
rest of the brain. These results suggest that it is not autism per se,
but high levels of alexithymia (in both individuals with and without
an autism spectrum condition diagnosis) that are predictive of
reduced empathic brain responses. Note, however, that the pre-
sent samples of control participants and patients with an autism
spectrum condition are not representative with respect to their
distribution of alexithymic traits within each group, as we aimed
to achieve an equal distribution of alexithymic scores in both sam-
ples. Far higher rates of alexithymia are reported across those with
autism spectrum conditions than in the typical population. Thus, if
we were to replicate these findings in a representative sample of
control and individuals with an autism spectrum condition, we
would expect to observe weaker empathy-related brain activation
in anterior insula in the autism spectrum condition group, reflect-
ing the higher prevalence of alexithymia in the autism spectrum
condition population.
These results replicate previous findings of a crucial role for in-
sular cortex in pain-related empathy (Morrison et al., 2004, 2007;
Singer et al., 2004, 2006, 2008; Jackson et al., 2005, 2006;
Cheng et al., 2007; Gu and Han, 2007; Lamm et al., 2007a, b;
Saarela et al., 2007). Thus, the activation observed in left anterior
insula when participants empathized with their partners when they
were suffering overlapped with coordinates of empathic brain re-
sponses in anterior insula described in previous empathy studies
(Singer et al., 2004, 2006, 2008). More importantly, we extended
previous findings that showed modulation of empathic brain re-
sponses in insular cortices as a function of contextual appraisal and
affective link (Singer et al., 2006; Lamm et al., 2007a, b; Hein and
Singer, 2008) to the domain of individual trait characteristics. Here
we show that individual characteristics such as the ability to inter-
ocept upon one’s own emotions are also a modulatory factor for
empathic brain responses.
Taken together, the previous (Silani et al., 2008) and the pre-
sent findings suggest that people with interoceptive deficits re-
flected in high levels of alexithymia show reduced activation in
insular cortices while interocepting on their own emotions as
well as when empathizing with others who are feeling pain. In
both studies, high correlations between an alexithymia scale
(TAS-20) and a classical trait empathy scale (Davis IRI), were
observed. This pattern of results is consistent with the notion
that our ability to empathize relies on the same neural circuitries
underlying our capacity to understand our own feeling states and
that these capacities are intimately linked with functions of the
anterior insula cortices (Singer et al., 2004, 2009).
Studying individual differences in alexithymia within a popula-
tion of individuals with an autism spectrum condition enabled us
to obtain a more detailed picture of the social deficits observed in
autism spectrum conditions. This picture illustrates the heterogen-
eity of individuals with an autism spectrum condition with regard
to empathy deficits. Thus, not all individuals with an autism spec-
trum condition, but only a subgroup with interoceptive deficits,
seem to be impaired on the empathic route to social cognition.
This finding is in agreement with earlier research pointing to a
large heterogeneity in cognitive profiles within the autistic popu-
lations (Pellicano et al., 2006; White et al., 2009a, b) and cautions
against overgeneralization of deficits commonly attributed to
autism spectrum conditions to every individual on the autistic
spectrum. Despite this heterogeneity within individuals with
autism spectrum conditions, it is clear that an outstanding research
question in this area relates to the increased prevalence of high
levels of alexithymia in this group compared to neurotypical
individuals.
Finally, these findings speak to the differentiation between
Theory of Mind and empathy and point to a dissociation between
these two streams of social cognition. Interestingly, analysis of the
subscale scores from the Davis IRI (Supplementary Table 2) sup-
port the previously-reported deficit in cognitive perspective taking
in autism spectrum conditions (Frith and Happe´, 2005). The
autism spectrum condition group reported significantly less per-
spective taking (see Rogers et al., 2007 who reported a similar
pattern of subscale scores). Demonstrations of a Theory of Mind
deficit in autism spectrum conditions, together with intact em-
pathy shown by the present study, support the suggestion that
empathy and Theory of Mind are dissociable. It should be noted
however, that Theory of Mind was not directly tested in the pre-
sent study. Therefore, future research should focus on testing four
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groups of individuals, individuals with and without autism spec-
trum conditions with low and high degrees of alexithymia, using
pure empathy and Theory of Mind tasks in order to test whether
participants with an autism spectrum condition show Theory of
Mind but not empathy deficits, and those with alexithymia em-
pathy but not theory of mind deficits. Evidence for such a double
dissociation would not only inform the development of clinical
interventions tailored to the specific difficulties of these groups,
but could also help us to obtain a more sophisticated picture of
the different neural networks underlying social cognition in adults.
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